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EU citizenship and the edges of Europe 
 
Jo Shaw, University of Edinburgh1 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers the prospects for EU citizenship in the current EU economic 
and political crisis. It contrasts the neglect of the concept of EU citizenship on the 
part of Member States, including their willingness to trample on many aspects of the 
free movement principle, with the interest in EU citizenship shown by substate 
political actors in Scotland, where an independence referendum is under 
consideration. 
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I 
 
The European Union is being pushed close to the edge. We live, it would seem, in 
times in crisis – in both economic and political terms. For perhaps the first time in its 
50-year existence, the European integration process appears to many to be as much 
part of the problem as it is likely to be part of the solution. What are the implications 
of these crises and processes for EU citizenship? How is EU citizenship faring as the 
‘edges’ of Europe (and its core) become ever more contested? How robust is EU 
citizenship? What resources does it provide for developing arguments to protect or 
develop citizens’ rights and democratic processes in a crisis context? Does the 
concept help us to better understand how the relationship between economic and 
political conjunctures plays out at the level of the EU, its institutions and its Member 
States? In this brief note, I will sketch some preliminary thoughts on these important 
questions. 
Clearly a simple mantra of ‘more EU citizenship’, just like a simple mantra of 
‘more Europe’, is not going to solve these problems alone. The crisis in the Eurozone 
appears to have exhausted the limits of solidarity between the EU Member States, 
even though political leaders continue to pay lip service to the benefits of and need 
for greater political union. None the less, unless we are to give up entirely on the 
                                                 
1 Jo Shaw, Salvesen Chair of European Institutions, University of Edinburgh (jo.shaw@ed.ac.uk). This 
work was supported by funding from the CITSEE project (The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the 
Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia), based at the University of Edinburgh, UK. CITSEE is 
funded by the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework 
Programme, ERC Grant no. 230239, and the support of the ERC is acknowledged with thanks. I would 
also like to thank Igor Štiks for comments on this paper. A version of this paper will appear in Claudio 
Franzius/Franz C. Mayer/Jürgen Neyer (eds.), Grenzen der europäischen Integration? Limits of European 
integration?, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2012 (in press). 
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processes and promises of European integration in terms of its capacity to deliver 
important public goods, such as geopolitical stability and – hitherto – considerable 
prosperity, it is still important to look closely at the existing and possible future 
elements of the integration process, including the legal framework of EU citizenship 
to see how they interact with challenges such as the promotion of democracy in times 
of austerity and political crisis. Such elements might help to improve solidarity, 
democratic accountability and legitimacy at the EU level, without undermining the 
political processes at the national level that continue to be important in sustaining the 
consent of the population at large for budget cuts and austerity measures in the face 
of hostile world markets.  
Although the crisis in the Eurozone dominates the headlines, the problems 
faced by the EU and its Member States which have effects in relation to citizenship 
and the limits of EU citizenship in particular are many and various (enlargement, 
Schengen, etc.). The prospects for future EU enlargement in south east Europe – 
beyond Croatia which is very close to expected accession in 2013 – have largely been 
kicked into the long grass, with consequent negative impacts upon the politics of the 
Western Balkan states where incentives for political elites to pursue further 
democratisation, the consolidation of reforms of judicial and state institutions, and 
the completion of painful and controversial transitions towards balanced, open and 
sustainable economies appear to have disappeared altogether. For Turkey – with a 
growth rate averaging above 5% for the last ten years – EU enlargement appears 
increasingly to be an irrelevance, leaving it largely impervious to the negativity 
regarding its prospects for membership, which continues to emanate from many 
Member State governments. It therefore seems increasingly unlikely that EU 
citizenship will see a territorial enlargement in the near future, although its effects 
already resonate in significant ways outside the EU’s borders, e.g. in the interface 
with visa liberalisation, and through the ‘halfway house’ status enjoyed under the 
Association Agreement by Turkish citizens. 
States such as Poland, which has a nominal obligation to join the Eurozone 
when the conditions are right, doubtless view the arrival of that date with fear and 
loathing, given the state of the weaker economies in that zone, and the better data 
being returned by those outside. Even in core areas of EU activity, such as the free 
movement of persons, the Schengen zone appears to be on the point of unravelling 
with greater recourse to the restoration of national frontier controls and less 
(European) parliamentary scrutiny proposed by ministers. 
Both politically and economically, many of the EU Member States find 
themselves in increasing difficulties. Italy, Spain and Portugal all find themselves in 
significant financial difficulties because of the increasing impossibility, especially for 
the latter two states, of borrowing at a reasonable cost on the international financial 
markets. Ireland, like Greece and Portugal, has needed a Eurozone-led international 
bailout in order to avoid a sovereign default, and it has struggled to find its way out 
of recession. While its citizens and residents suffer desperately from five consecutive 
years of recession, in the political sphere, Greece has seen polarisation and 
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widespread demands for a new political order2 as its continuing membership of the 
Eurozone and even of the EU itself has continued to be called into question. 
Meanwhile we have seen significant votes for parties of both the far right and the far 
left, including those whose democratic credentials are highly questionable, in its first 
inconclusive general election in 2012. The country is stuck in a paradox whereby the 
vast majority of voters wish to avoid exiting the euro, but equally are reluctant to 
vote for the parties that have led the moves towards the bailout and the attendant 
austerity measures. The far right neo-fascist Golden Dawn party, elected to 
parliament for the first time in 2012, has spearheaded attacks – both verbal and 
physical – on immigrant communities, scapegoating them for some of Greece’s 
economic difficulties. Increasingly visible destitution in Greece raises the question of 
willingness of European states to address in a meaningful way the challenges of 
intra-continental solidarity. 
This is not an isolated incident. In many Member States, the rise of far right 
political parties has led to an increase in hostility towards immigrants, putting 
broader efforts to promote integration and tolerance into reverse. In Hungary, 
political convulsions of a rather different ilk, which some say amount to a type of 
constitutional coup involving highly partisan amendments to the constitution and 
the republican structure of the state, have combined with budgetary problems 
related to its excessive deficit, to give rise to a toxic political mix. Hungary also has 
its own looming far right forces in the form of Jobbik, whose members have been 
responsible for serious attacks upon minority groups, especially the Roma. In France, 
the far right Front National candidate scored a significant success in the first round of 
the presidential elections in 2012. One of the effects of these electoral successes has 
been that mainstream parties of the left and the right have adopted anti-immigration 
political rhetoric as a means of staving off the electoral challenge of the far right, 
often with significant impacts upon immigrant communities who have seen a 
considerable decrease in their levels of security, for example, through ever more 
restrictive settlement or family migration policies. 
Many commentators regard the steps taken to manage the financial crisis, 
involving the replacement of elected political leaders in a number of states with so-
called ‘technocrats’ who meet the approval of the international financial community, 
as highly problematic from a democratic point of view, and as being one of the 
factors contributing to a polarisation of views at the national level. The banking and 
financial crises since 2008, and the contagion that has threatened the continued 
existence of the Eurozone, have resulted, in many people’s eyes, in the undermining 
of democratic processes within states, and a reinforcement of a negative tendency for 
key decisions to be taken behind closed doors without any element of real 
                                                 
2 For a cogent exposition of the arguments that Greece’s political system is ‘broken’, see P. 
Eleftheriadis, ‘Only a new political system can rescue Greece’, FT.com, 27 May 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a02f585a-a5bd-11e1-b77a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1xnhIDzaN.  
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accountability either to national parliaments or to electorates (whether through 
European or national level elections). 
Moreover, suggestions from German politicians that one of the ways out of 
the crisis must be deepened political union beg as many questions as they answer, as 
such union would almost certainly involve the types of treaty changes that the 
Federal Constitutional Court is unlikely to find acceptable when they are tested 
against the enduring foundation stones of the German polity, which the majority of 
the members of that court judge to be enshrined within the Basic Law. From that 
point of view, it would seem that politicians find themselves between a rock and a 
hard place. In any event, it is not at all clear what sort of ‘union’ is envisaged in this 
context, and there is no evidence that it will be rooted in concepts of solidarity which 
recognise the diversity of political and economic systems in Europe, as opposed to 
being a ‘protective’ union which will reinforce the hegemony of what is seen as the 
‘German’ approach to austerity. 
In the UK, a different type of political crisis is coming to the fore, as the 
Scottish National Party government in Scotland moves closer to organising a 
referendum in Scotland on negotiating independence from the rest of the UK. In and 
of itself, this would be an exercise of democratic sovereignty by the Scottish 
referendum electorate, but it is also a move which might run counter to the views of 
the majority of UK citizens (who cannot vote in such a referendum) or even of those 
persons – UK citizens or otherwise – who were actually born in Scotland. Scottish 
independence is a significant political debate which could have implications for other 
Member States where minority ‘nations’ are watching carefully the successes and 
failures of the Scottish independence movement and the position taken vis-à-vis the 
question of Scotland’s (and the rest of the UK’s) membership of the EU after putative 
independence (both continued and as a new member). What are the implications of 
such a move for (EU) citizenship? 
 
II 
 
A small contribution to the much bigger enterprise of addressing democratic 
legitimacy in the EU and its Member States involves a close look at the pressures to 
which EU citizenship is being subjected under the current conditions of ‘crisis’. 
Contributions along such lines by EU lawyers would probably start with the mantra 
that EU citizenship is ‘destined to be the fundamental status of the nationals of the 
Member States’, which was first raised in Grzelczyk,3 assuming this to be a building 
block onto which one can then graft a set of comments about the extent to which this 
aspiration has so far been achieved. This linear approach is not helpful. In times of 
austerity and times of crisis, it is just as likely that EU citizenship – which curtails 
Member States’ sovereignty in fields such as immigration and welfare by enforcing 
                                                 
3 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve [2001] ECR-I 6193 at 
para. 31. 
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the free movement and equal treatment principles, and which now contains 
important political elements in the shape of the electoral rights instituted by the 
Treaty of Maastricht for EU citizens resident in other Member States – will be seen as 
threatening the majority of citizens of the Member States who are not actively using 
free movement rights (or do not perceive themselves as doing so) and instead as 
empowering a minority at the expense of the majority. EU citizenship is not widely 
seen as some sort of (potential) universal good, but as something for the minority. 
This sets up a potentially dangerous polarisation between ‘the statics’ and ‘the 
mobiles’. In that respect, EU citizenship could be seen as a possible and indeed 
perhaps likely victim of the crisis, rather than as a means for confronting the 
economic and political problems we face, whether by promoting labour mobility and 
solidarity across borders or by highlighting the importance of continued efforts to 
promote democratisation at every level of the multi-level euro-polity. We should 
therefore proceed cautiously and without preconceptions of its underlying value to 
evaluate what is happening to EU citizenship at the present time, and in that context 
we need to take careful account of the limits of EU citizenship, as much as the 
potentiality that it holds. 
The limits of EU citizenship have been much discussed. Niamh Nic Shuibhne 
has provided a very useful conceptual scheme primarily from a legal perspective, 
distinguishing between the normative, the inner and the outer limits of EU citizenship.4 
To this one might add a concept of symbolic limits – the fact that even those exercising 
rights associated with the European integration process (e.g. consumer rights 
enhanced as a result of a supranational harmonisation) typically do not see 
themselves as acting in the guise of EU citizens. The question of normative limits 
addresses the capacity of the EU to ‘carry’ a concept of citizenship given that it is not 
a state. But as it is an entity with certain state-like, or near-state, characteristics such 
as its legal system and constitutional structure, we should consequently regard it, in 
those terms, as being ‘citizenship-capable’, although that begs the question of what 
sort of citizenship EU citizenship should be. If the citizens of a polity are those with 
membership rights and obligations, living under conditions regulated by law, then 
EU citizenship – as a status that is complementary to (and legally derived from) the 
citizenship of the Member States – is indeed a form of citizenship, albeit one which is 
quite different in character to national citizenship. EU citizenship is thus normatively 
limited to precisely the extent that EU integration is also normatively limited, by 
reference to the terms of the present constitutional settlement. 
Of course, we also know that because of the activism of the Court of Justice 
EU citizenship has in recent years become something of a ‘leader’ or driver of 
integration processes, e.g. in areas where case law has resulted in significant 
protections against deportation for the third country national family members of EU 
                                                 
4 N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘The Outer Limits of EU Citizenship: Displacing Economic Free Movement 
Rights?’, in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 167. 
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citizens. But without a dynamic of further integration, EU citizenship must normally 
‘match’ rather than determine the scope and limits of political integration. Although 
the Court’s activism has developed the concept of EU citizenship in some interesting 
ways since the late 1990s (such as the case of Martínez Sala, which first established the 
space within which the concept of citizenship could evolve independently of existing 
constraints of the free movement rights established by the Treaties and subsequent 
legislation5) in practice the Court cannot and should not usurp the role of the 
Member States as the ‘masters of the Treaties’ in this and other areas, for to do 
otherwise would be to risk its entire legitimacy. There are, therefore, normative 
boundaries to the concept of EU citizenship, although recent case law has meant that 
it is not entirely clear where these are located. 
A similar caveat can be applied when thinking about the outer limits of EU 
citizenship. According to Nic Shuibhne’s scheme, these are the limits that 
circumscribe the present content of EU citizenship, such as the rights which can be 
derived from the scheme and wording of the Treaties and secondary legislation. This 
includes, of course, any territorial limits to which the EU and EU citizenship are 
subject. On the subject of the outer limits, Nic Shuibhne’s reaches the conclusion that 
 
The outer limits might be transcended politically through an agreed revision of the 
normative parameters of EU citizenship. But in the absence of this, and working with 
what we have, the development of citizenship rights should not be thought of as a 
boundless exercise. 
 
This comment could just as well apply to the inner limits, that is, to the manner 
in which EU citizenship is limited by a ‘state space’ into which it cannot intrude. 
Here, too, the Court’s activism has had a significant impact with significant and often 
contested intrusions into immigration and welfare sovereignty as a result of the 
application of free movement rules and equal treatment principles. Inevitably the 
Court’s activism runs into the problem of how it can reconcile the continued 
evolution (expansion?) of the domain of EU citizenship rights with the ‘wholly 
internal rule’ which seeks to preserve some (national) situations entirely outside the 
reach of EU law. This has significant repercussions where EU citizenship appears to 
give mobile citizens ‘better’ rights than static ones.6 
A close look to see how far the Court of Justice has carried the concept of EU 
citizenship, from what might be thought of as its modest beginnings in the Treaty of 
Maastricht, could indeed bring many insights into these evolving limits and how 
these are playing out in times of ‘crisis’ where the very idea of integration is under 
pressure.7 Even at the same time as free movement rights are becoming increasingly 
                                                 
5 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala v Freistadt Berlin [1998] ECR-I 2691. 
6 C-127/08 Metock et al v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECR I-06241. 
7 For a fuller discussion of the relevant case law by this author see J. Shaw, ‘A view of the citizenship 
classics: Martinez Sala and subsequent cases on citizenship of the Union’, in M. Maduro and L. Azoulai 
(eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law; The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome 
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politicised (and less normalised) in many Member States, it might be suggested that 
the Court – accompanied by some of its most enthusiastic cheerleaders – has come 
close to making this process into an apparently ‘boundless exercise’ which could see 
significant threats to the continuing legitimacy of the very concept of EU citizenship 
if mobile EU citizens are somehow seen to be getting ‘benefits’ (e.g. access to certain 
family reunion rights) which are denied to those who remain static. According to 
Richard Bellamy, this could destabilise the social compact of longer-term 
commitment and loyalty that must lie at the heart of any stable successful polity.8 
The Court of Justice could, therefore, be said to be heading into dangerous waters 
with its recent development of a new jurisdictional test for the applicability of EU 
law in the citizenship area which is based on whether a measure taken by a Member 
State could be said to deprive an EU citizen of the ‘substance’ of his or her rights. 
This is all the more so given that the Court has yet to define precisely what is meant 
by the substance of citizenship rights in its case law.9 Although some have tried to 
take this a step further, in order to mainstream fundamental rights concerns within 
and across the EU Member States, by arguing that a deprivation of fundamental 
rights is by definition a deprivation of the very substance of citizenship rights,10 it is 
not clear that such an argument could or should gain further traction. It would 
certainly involve also a fundamental review of the current restrictions on the scope of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights in relation to EU competences. The political will 
for such a change seems weak at present, and not all would agree that it would be a 
desirable route for the EU to follow. 
 
III 
 
Away from the immediate confines of the case law of the Court of Justice, there is 
one interesting case where the limits of EU citizenship appear to be in the process of 
being tested out by political actors in ways that build on that case law and which 
take advantage of tensions within and across the multi-level Euro-polity and its 
Member States. Thus EU citizenship has been invoked by various political actors 
who are involved in the Scottish independence debate in ways that suggest that its 
                                                                                                                                                        
Treaty, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, 356-362 and J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship: contrasting dynamics at the 
interface of integration and constitutionalism’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU 
Law, 2nd Edition, OUP, 2011, 575-609. 
8 R. Bellamy, ‘Evaluating Union citizenship: belonging, rights and participation within the EU’, (2008) 
12 Citizenship Studies 597-611. 
9 The apparent breadth of the original formulation put forward by the Grand Chamber of the Court of 
Justice in Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, judgment of 8 March 2011 at para 42 appears to have been 
significantly qualified by a case decided almost at the same time but by a smaller Chamber (C-434/09 
Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, judgment of 5 May 2011) and a 
subsequent Grand Chamber case (C-256/11 Dereci and others v. Bundesministerium fur Inneres, judgment 
of 15 December 2011).  
10 A. Von Bogdandy et al, ‘Reverse Solange – protecting the essence of Fundamental Rights against EU 
Member States,’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489–519. 
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limits could indeed be politically pliable. It has long been argued by Scottish 
National Party representatives that with Scotland already in the EU as part of the 
UK, once it becomes independent the essentials of this situation should simply 
continue. A good example of this approach is the statement of the spokesman for the 
Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond in response to the publication of a controversial 
publication by the group Business for a New Europe which suggested that a post-
independence Scotland would have to apply de novo for membership of the EU,11 
with all the attendant difficulties of the candidature process. Refuting the threat of 
accession, the spokesman said: 
 
Scotland is already part of the territory of the European Union and the people of 
Scotland are citizens of the EU – and, as distinguished legal, constitutional and 
European experts have confirmed, there is no provision for either of these 
circumstances to change upon independence, and the rest of the UK will be exactly 
(sic) the same position.12 
 
This argument has been developed more fully by Aidan O’Neill QC. He has 
argued that the very fact that ‘Scottish citizens’ (i.e. those who would become citizens 
of an independent Scotland) have previously been EU citizens by virtue of their UK 
citizenship means that a putatively independent Scotland must be regarded as 
effectively already a Member State of the EU, because of the acquired rights of those 
citizens. The route to clarity might come, suggests O’Neill, via the Court of Justice 
(CJEU) if it is asked what is the status of post-independence Scottish citizens: 
 
The question to ask is whether the CJEU would consider that the fact that Scotland 
became independent required that all (or any portion) of the previous UK citizenry 
thereby be deprived of their acquired rights as EU citizens?  Given the CJEU’s high 
theology of the primacy of EU law, and of EU citizenship as being “the fundamental 
status of nationals of the Member States”, it is suggested that the most likely position 
that the Luxembourg court would take, if faced with the question of Scottish 
independence, would be … [to] … rule that Scotland and EWNI [England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland] should each succeed to the UK’s existing membership of the EU, but 
now as two States rather than as one.13 
 
This does seem to suggest that legal reality can follow political reality in the 
event of independence rather smoothly when it comes to redefining the normative 
limits of EU citizenship after Scottish independence. This conclusion is a little hard to 
square with usual approaches to state succession under international law. But it is 
                                                 
11 In Depth: Scottish Independence and EU Accession, March 2012, 
http://www.bnegroup.org/images/uploads/publications/files/In_Depth_-
_Scottish_Independence_and_EU_Accession_-_BNE_March_2012_1.pdf.  
12 http://news.stv.tv/politics/301178-post-referendum-currency-uncertainty/.  
13 See A. O’Neill, ‘A Quarrel in a Faraway Country?: Scotland, Independence and the EU’ 
http://eutopialaw.com/2011/11/14/685/, 14 November 2011. 
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interesting to see the concept of (EU) citizenship, combined in O’Neill’s case with an 
argument based on the primacy of EU law, being mooted as a useful prism through 
which to view fundamental social and political choices such as the possible 
reconfiguration of an existing Member State into two independent states, both of 
which would like to be Member States. This means that discussions around the post-
Scottish independence status of Scotland and the rest of the UK (or EWNI as it is now 
usually known in the debate) are not discussed solely by reference to either the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the international law of state 
succession or the internal EU questions about processes of Treaty change and 
enlargement.14 
It is also interesting in that context to note the positive approach to the political 
rights attaching to EU citizenship taken by the current Scottish government, which 
has proposed that – as with the referendum on devolution organised by the UK 
government in 1997, and as with the Scottish Parliament elections themselves since 
1999 (both of which were choices made by the Westminster Government on behalf of 
the UK as a whole) – the franchise for the referendum on independence should 
include the 60,000 EU citizens resident in Scotland.15 This might also suggest that this 
group would have the right to vote in what would become Scottish national elections 
after independence. It would be anomalous to give such a group the right to vote in 
the referendum on independence (thus allowing them to affect this fundamental 
political and constitutional choice) and then not to allow them a vote under the 
circumstances of ordinary politics, in the event that the separatist movement which 
they are invited to participate in were to be successful. However, such a conclusion 
might be affected by the related question of who would be entitled to be a citizen of 
‘new’ Scotland. 
But at the same time, even under the current political settlement, EU citizenship 
shows up the anomalies that can and do occur within states when there is internal 
diversity of social policy choices within asymmetrically organised polities, because of 
the application of the wholly internal rule set against the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality which applies in cases which fall within the 
scope of EU law. This means that Scotland must from 2012 onwards give EU citizens 
the right to attend Scottish universities under the same conditions as Scottish 
domiciled students i.e. for free, if admitted. This extends also to EU citizens 
domiciled elsewhere in the UK (e.g. Irish citizens in Northern Ireland), even though 
Scotland can ‘discriminate’ against UK citizens domiciled elsewhere in the UK by not 
                                                 
14 See further the written evidence to the Scottish Affairs Select Committee of the UK Parliament by 
Aidan O’Neill QC on ‘The Referendum on Separation for Scotland’, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmscotaf/writev/referendum/rs13.htm. 
This point is picked up by other interveners in the debate: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/writev/ref/m01.htm.  
15 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-16895691. For further details on the 
mechanics of the proposed referendum see 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/02/22120157/7. 
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giving them the benefit of Scotland’s regime under which the costs of tuition for 
undergraduate students at Scottish universities are essentially borne by the taxpayer. 
This is because of the effects of EU free movement and equal treatment law as it 
stands, and because of the interaction between these rules and the wholly internal 
rule which allows Scotland to implement its asymmetric choices in relation to the 
allocation of public resources within the UK and to UK citizens alone solely by reference 
to UK law. 
 
IV 
 
Setting the Scottish independence debate aside, we can see that in many other areas 
the integrity and sustainability of EU citizenship are now coming under heavy 
pressure from political actors. EU citizenship is rarely seen to offer the basis for a 
solution to current problems by offering solidarity within a free market by allowing, 
for example, labour to circulate to where it is needed most. A good example is the 
apparent threat by the UK government to prevent ‘immigration’ from Greek citizens 
in the event of their state’s exit from the Eurozone.16 As it happens, these alarmist 
reactions seem likely to be unfounded, as there is no suggestion that the UK would 
be a ‘destination’ for Greeks ‘escaping’ their austerity hit economy. In fact, there are 
already signs that those Greeks seeking to take advantage of their free movement 
rights under the Treaties, perhaps in order to seek work, are going to Germany, not 
the UK.17 But the very fact that UK politicians feel free to challenge the core of EU 
citizenship in this way suggests a lack of robust commitment to these principles on 
their part. There does not seem to be an effective legal basis for restricting the access 
of Greek citizens to the labour market if Greece does not actually leave the EU. The 
only possibility is to apply Article 347 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, but this could only apply in extreme circumstances and should not 
be applicable if Greece undergoes an orderly and managed exit from the Eurozone, 
but not the EU as a whole: 18 
                                                 
16 See the report on the views of the Home Secretary 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9291493/Theresa-May-well-stop-migrants-if-
euro-collapses.html), subsequently refuted by the Deputy Prime Minister as ‘apocalyptic’ in character: 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9293763/No-British-drawbridge-to-stop-Greek-immigration-says-
Nick-Clegg.html). 
17 See ‘Nearly a million new immigrants in Germany’, 20 May 2012, Deutsche Welle, 
http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15964384,00.html.  
18 Even in the event of Greece’s departure from the EU, the arguments developed in relation to 
Scotland seem to suggest Greek citizens should enjoy some sort of ‘acquired rights’ protection. Indeed, 
any full ‘Grexit’, not just from the Eurozone, but also from the EU as a whole would be likely to be 
negotiated and involve transitional protections at least for Greek citizens already resident and 
working in other Member States. It is possible that UK officials had been thinking of such a scenario, 
or had perhaps been thinking that an exit from the Eurozone might involve some sort of temporary 
restoration of capital movement controls on the part of Greece, against which the other Member States 
might bargain some sort of temporary labour market controls. However, such measures would 
require treaty action to be legally binding. 
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Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed 
to prevent the functioning of the internal market being affected by measures which a 
Member State may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbances 
affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, serious international 
tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted 
for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security. 
 
While these may be the ‘exceptional circumstances’ referred to by the UK Home 
Secretary in her interview, they would probably only apply to immediate population 
movements in a crisis situation, not to a longer term process of emigration by Greek 
citizens seeking employment opportunities elsewhere in the EU. Resisting that type 
of free movement would seem to require either removing Greece from the EU or 
alternatively the UK leaving the EU in order to escape the effects of free movement. 
The general tenor of the public approach taken by the UK government to 
assuring the British public that they could be protected against an apocalyptic 
‘invasion’ of work-seeking or indeed welfare-seeking Greek citizens would seem to 
build quite logically upon the way in which ‘immigration’ to the UK from post-2004 
and post-2007 Member States has been constructed in political and popular discourse 
in the UK. While access to the UK labour market was permitted for the so-called A8 
states of central and eastern Europe after 2004, in contradistinction to almost all the 
other Member States, in fact these practices of free movement, often circular in 
character and generally regarded by informed studies to have been a benefit to the 
UK economy,19 are regarded in political and popular rhetoric as an increasingly 
problematic form of immigration that has to be controlled.20 One image that is 
portrayed is that of the benefit tourist, seeking to take advantage of the UK welfare 
state when in practice there is no evidence of such a threat at all and in any event 
states such as the UK have largely walled off their welfare states against such 
incursions or exploitation. 
A mix of confusing messages come across regarding what is universally termed 
in the UK press ‘Eastern European immigration’, even though the vast majority of 
the states from such mobility emanates would not regard themselves either 
geographically or geo-politically as part of ‘Eastern’ Europe. On the one hand, 
citizens of new Member States are seen as undermining solidarity within the host 
state based on labour costs, by being willing to work for lower wages than domestic 
workers. On the other hand, they are readily excluded from the welfare bargain of 
those states, and thus are forced to be prepared to work in whatever jobs they can 
                                                 
19 J. Doyle, ‘EU Migrants ‘good for UK economy’’, The Independent, 24 July 2009, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/eu-migrants-good-for-uk-economy-
1759279.html.  
20 See J. Shaw, N. Miller and M. Fletcher, Getting to grips with EU citizenship: issues of friction between UK 
immigration law and EU free movement law, Research Report, University of Edinburgh, forthcoming July 
2012 (available from http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/overlap).  
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find. Failure to find work does not normally mean for such a group that the ordinary 
‘safety’ net applicable to the unemployed or homeless persons will step in. 
Thus the equality that is supposed to underlie the free movement rules seems to 
be increasingly under threat from all sides. The UK has mounted a pilot programme 
of removing to their home state destitute EU citizens from the new Member States; 
France and Italy are just two of the Member States which have mounted 
controversial and legally doubtful actions against EU citizens of Roma ethnicity,21 
seeking their removal either because they do not qualify under the Treaty’s free 
movement rules (which do not give an unqualified right of residence beyond three 
months to persons who are not economically active in the broadest sense (which 
includes students) or self-sufficient) or simply because they are somehow collectively 
associated with problems of crime and disorder. For those states it would seem that 
free movement is not for the poor or for those of certain ethnic backgrounds. Clearly 
reasons of crime and disorder – if applied collectively to whole groups – do not 
qualify as valid reasons for removal under the Citizens’ Rights Directive.22 But 
unfortunately, as the Commission itself has admitted, there remain profound 
problems with national implementation of this measure. In a 2008 report23 the 
Commission stated baldly that  
 
The overall transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC is rather disappointing. Not one 
Member State has transposed the Directive effectively and correctly in its entirety. Not 
one Article of the Directive has been transposed effectively and correctly by all 
Member States. 
 
Things have barely improved since then, for while the Commission’s attempts to 
bring enforcement actions against Member States may have produced more ‘paper’ 
compliance, it is not clear that provisions of EU law remain any more accessible or 
useable – in a meaningful way – by socially excluded groups such as the Roma or 
homeless and destitute people than they ever were in the past. Thus application in 
practice of EU law remains a problem if implementation has been confined to the 
legislative level and has not penetrated in an effective way into administrative 
practices. 
In similar terms, some of the long cherished freedoms of the single market 
seem to be under threat in the form of new plans from the Member States to make it 
easier to reinstate temporary Schengen frontier controls and in so doing increasingly 
to bypass the control functions of both the European Commission and the European 
                                                 
21 S. Carrera and A. Atger, L’affaire des Roms : A Challenge to the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, CEPS Paper, September 2010, http://www.ceps.eu/book/l%E2%80%99affaire-des-roms-
challenge-eu%E2%80%99s-area-freedom-security-and-justice.  
22 Directive 2004/38 of the European Parliament and the Council on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004 
L158/77. 
23 COM(2008)840, at p3. 
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Parliament.24 While the primary intention of these measures may be that they are 
needed to restrict the movement of (certain) third country nationals, in practice the 
effects will be felt by all, regardless of citizenship status. This was, after all, the 
rationale for the removal of internal frontier controls in the first place.25 A 
combination of a lack of commitment to free movement and threats to frontier free 
travel threatens a perfect storm of challenges to the core principles of the EU 
integration project. 
 
V 
 
2013 is the European Year of Citizens,26 celebrating the legal, political and symbolic 
power of the concept of EU citizenship. This is part of a wider endeavour of the 
Barroso II Commission to make citizenship a political priority and to focus on the 
obstacles to the exercise of EU citizenship rights, including free movement rights, 
political rights and other ancillary rights attaching to EU citizens. Alongside these 
initiatives, the 2012 launch of the process allowing for European Citizens’ Initiatives 
bringing together one million citizens’ signatures has promised much, but seems 
likely to deliver little in view of the limitations of this type of measure as an 
instrument to strengthen democracy and participation. Overall, the harsh reality of 
the pressures under which the European integration project finds itself at the present 
time suggests that keeping in place the existing legal framework for citizenship rights 
is likely to be the limit of reasonable ambition for the foreseeable future. The 
symbolic capital associated with the term ‘citizenship’ is supposed to work in favour 
of the EU. That was one of the motivations of including this term in the Treaty of 
Maastricht, and indeed since 1993 it could be argued that these provisions of the 
Treaty, largely thanks to the Court of Justice’s activism, have over-delivered, at least 
in rhetorical terms. 
In practice, under the current conditions, where the edges of Europe seem to 
threaten in ever more immediate ways the very core of the integration project, the 
presence of a concept of citizenship at the supranational level is more likely to be 
seen as a provocation and a threat to the continued existence and relevance of the 
Member States, under whose protective umbrella (however leaky) citizens still want 
to take refuge in times of crisis. The voices calling for free movement to be given 
greater prominence and the mobility of young people in particular to be supported in 
                                                 
24 Details of the approach taken by the Council of Ministers can be found in the Council Press Release 
No. 10760/12, detailing the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers on 7 and 8 June 2012. 
25 For a brief evaluation of the approach of the Council of Ministers and what it might mean see the 
Migrants’ Rights blog: http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/2012/06/vote-reintroduction-schengen-
area-border-checks-more-evidence-depth-crisis-eu, June 12 2012. A more extended, but earlier, 
analysis of the Schengen Governance Package fills out the arguments more fully: S. Carrera, An 
Assessment of the Commission’s 2011 Schengen Governance Package: Preventing abuse by EU member states of 
freedom of movement?, CEPS Paper, March 2012. 
26  Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Year 
of Citizens (2013), COM(2011) 489. 
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order to combat youth unemployment are very much minority voices.27 At the 
present time, EU citizenship is simply not perceived as being relevant to the 
democratic and other challenges that almost all the Member States are facing, except 
in the case where subnational political movements seek to use it as part of their 
panoply of arguments for autonomy. The positivity surrounding the potential of EU 
citizenship in the context of polity renewal in Scotland seems an exception against a 
backdrop of widespread attempts to undermine EU citizenship on the part of 
Member States (and certainly a failure to highlight publicly what its benefits might 
be). While some idealists might still think that facing up to these challenges primarily 
involves the task of reasserting the basic principles of the EU and of its legal order – 
and this is indeed an attractive prospect when one is faced with some members of the 
UK Government asserting the need to confront the (so far imagined) ‘threat’ of a 
Greek invasion by undermining one of the main precepts of EU law – it fails to take 
sufficient account of the extent to which there is now a climate of adversarialism as 
well as a sense of irrelevance attaching itself to the whole issue of EU citizenship. In 
that sense, the threat to the continued effectiveness of EU citizenship could be a 
harbinger of a more general threat to the continued existence of the EU itself. 
 
                                                 
27 T. Petersen, ‘Can Mobility offset Unemployment?’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Spotlight Europe, ♯2012/04 
June 2012. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
